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Abstract
Firm success is often associated with the development of better prod-
ucts. Private ￿rms undertake applied R&D seeking market advantage,
by capitalizing on the freely accessible results of basic research. But un-
patentable basic research often fails to address applied R&D open prob-
lems. What is the role of the incentives in improving the innovative perfor-
mance of an economy by matching partially motivated public researchers
to their mission? Sometimes government funded research projects are
mission-directed, yet in many cases the public sector academics indulge
in carrier-driven research. An innovation system where, as in the US, also
basic research is driven by patents, implicitly sets an ex-post incentive to
the researchers guided by invisible hand. For a public innovation system -
like the European one - designing an incentive scheme to motivate public
researchers is of key importance for fostering the performance of the eco-
nomic system. This paper extends the Schumpeterian multisector growth
model with vertical innovation by highlighting a link between the degree
of "targetness" of public research and aggregate innovation. A positive
e⁄ect of social capital is also proved. Keywords: Sequential Innovation,
Research Tools, Basic Research, Knowledge Management, Social Capital.
JEL Classi￿cation: H44, O31, O34, O38.
1 Introduction
We are in a period of fundamental reconsideration of US science and
technology policy. The end of the Cold War, the changing nature of
US economic competitiveness, and the increasing direct involvement
of the Congress in science policy have led to a lack of stability in goals
and philosophy. The roles of government, industry, and academia
are being examined in a fundamental way.
Charles West, President of MIT, MIT 1995 p.2.
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1Through the creation of a patent system, policy makers always tried to cre-
ate a protected ideal place for the creation and the transmission of a public good
- new knowledge and technology. Governments assign to the patent systems the
main functions of incentivizing the production of new technologies, of informing
society about their availability, and of creating a market for such new technolo-
gies. When this regulated market works properly - even at the cost of creating
some additional distortions - then consumers enjoy the bene￿ts of the resulting
innovative output produced in the economy. In this sense, it has often been
stressed how, among the di⁄erent instrument for protecting intellectual prop-
erty, patents constitute the most market-oriented ones (Guellec, 2007). Besides
the two functions traditionally assigned to the patent system - incentivizing and
di⁄using innovations in the economy - stands out a third political task: orient-
ing R&D activity towards the consumers￿needs1. We will focus on this in our
paper, with special attention to the non-patentable aspects of research.
Several studies - echoed by frequent industry leaders￿complaints - point
out an increasing complexity in the applied R&D activity (Kortum, 1993 and
1997; Segerstrom, 1998). If applied R&D - i.e. the private innovative arena
- is becoming increasingly more complicated, it may be crucial from a social
point of view to develop solid instruments of technological transfer from basic
research. Of course, a more and more di¢ cult applied research also reveals
a closer and closer interconnectedness between applied and basic research: to
produce new medical treatment, it is crucial to have an improvement in the
basic understanding of the pathologies. A good ongoing interaction between
basic and applied R&D, therefore implies that the scientists￿awareness of the
importance of the allocation of their basic research e⁄orts between the changing
open questions of applied science and technology could play a central role in
promoting progress.
A lot of basic research is public, particularly so in Europe and Asia, less
so in the US after the beginning of the Eighties. The e¢ cient provision of
public services, in the case publicly driven R&D, necessarily means the ability
of a government-led public innovation system to generate more innovations well
targeted from the society point of view . Hence the need to theoretically explore
the dimension of applied vs fundamental R&D in a macroeconomic framework.
In this paper, we develop a variant of Cozzi and Galli (2008) R&D-driven growth
model, with the explicit aim of analyzing the e⁄ects on equilibrium innovation
of simple monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes to the basic researcher
in the public system, when basic research outcomes are not patentable.
The structure of the model presented here, as in Cozzi and Galli (2008),
envisages basic and applied R&D in all sectors of the economy. Within each
industry, ￿rms are distinguished by the quality of the ￿nal good they produce.
When the state-of-the-art quality product in an industry ! 2 [0;1] is jt(!),
research ￿rms compete in order to learn how to produce the jt(!)+1st quality
product. This learning process involves a two-stage innovation path, so ￿rst a
1This is the utilitarian approach to the economics of science-based innovation: to ask if and
in what extent publicly employed scientists provide their customers (i.e. all the consumers)
with more or less satisfactory answers to their real needs.
2R&D unit catches a glimpse of innovation through the jt(!) + 1
2th inventive
half-idea and then other ￿rms engage in a patent race to implement it in the
jt(!)+1st quality product. We rule out basic research secrecy and assume that,
once invented, the ￿rst "half-idea" can be used by anyone who wants to try to
complete it. Also, we assume that "half-ideas" are industry speci￿c. A more
general analysis, to be done in future works, should also include new general
purpose technologies.
In our model, only non-pro￿t motivated R&D units - i.e. public laboratories
- try to invent a new ￿rst half idea in the basic research sector. We assume
that R&D ￿rms are able to instantaneously patent only the complete idea of
a product innovation. Then, patent protection may determine a monopolistic
position in the ￿nal good sector, and the winner of the ￿nal patent R&D race
becomes the sole producer of a jt(!) + 1 quality consumption good.
Unlike Cozzi and Galli (2008), where public basic research workers did not
care about the potential industrial applicability of their ￿ndings, we here adopt a
more optimistic view of the public sector: we will assume that the government
prizes researchers who more than others discover potentially useful scienti￿c
￿ndings. This entails a race to target basic research where there are better
chances of ￿nding an industrial application. However, since basic researchers
know that the government has only imperfect information about the usefulness
of their discoveries, they will purposefully undertake research also in other sub-
￿elds, where they have better chances to win the race. This entails a distribution
of e⁄orts in both useful and useless ￿elds.
The same incentive scheme can be interpreted as modelling non-monetary
compensations to above average researchers, in which status is granted by the
academic community. Then we prove that the higher "social capital", the more
closely observed the scientist￿ s e⁄ort by their peers, thereby leading to more tar-
geted innovation. Social capital, paired with socially responsible social norms,
can induce more innovation in equilibrium, as we will prove. Hence both mone-
tary and non-monetary compensations can have an e⁄ect, in a patent-free open
science world.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys - inevitably incompletely
- the literature on innovation and growth relevant for our model. Section 3 lays
down the model. Section 4 studies the equilibrium and derives the main results.
Section 5 concludes with some comments.
2 Related Literature
Starting in the early Nineties two main strands of literature, both aimed at
exploring the linkages between R&D, intellectual property and the economic
performance, developed. Probably motivated by the U.S.A. loss in technological
competitiveness (compared to Europe and Japan) during the Eighties, these two
￿ ows tried to incorporate the logic of the patent race literature ￿rst invented
3during the Eighties (see, among the others, Fudenberg et al. (1983), Reinganum
(1985), Grossman and Shapiro, (1987) into two new class of models.
One adopted a dynamic general equilibrium approach in order to depict the
e⁄ects on economic growth of the alternance in time of di⁄erent monopolistic po-
sitions producing (and selling) on the market only the top-quality existing good
or service in a given production line, each of these monopolistic positions being
the result of an endogenous choice to invest in R&D by private entrepreneurs.
This was the R&D-driven growth theory - among many other contributions see
Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopolous (1990), Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt
(1992) and (1996), Grossman and Helpman (1991).
Schumpeterian growth theory did not miss to acknowledge the importance
of accounting for the sequential and cumulative nature of ideas, by identifying
basic research with horizontal innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1996), by merging
the patent-design literature and the endogenous growth literature in a general
equilibrium framework (O￿ Donoghue and Zweimuller, 2004). In a similar vein,
it explicitly considers the possibility for an idea at pre-commercial stages of
development, or for an essential part of it, to be appropriated by non-inventors
(Cozzi, 2001; Cozzi and Spinesi, 2006).
The second stream of literature, by focussing on the problem of rewarding
R&D activity within the framework of sequential innovation, initially dominated
the discussion on intellectual property. After the pioneering contributions of
Grossman and Shapiro (1987), Scotchmer (1991), O￿ Donoghue, Scotchmer and
Thisse (1994), a broad literature2 now recognized that "most innovators stand
on shoulders of giants"3, i.e. innovation is a process sequential and cumulative
in nature where each invention builds on previous ideas. The biotechnology
sector o⁄ers many illustrations of the sub-sequential behavior of the research
activity. For example, success in advanced biotechnology, in agricultural, and
medical applications ￿elds is made possible thanks to the progress in genetic
engineering allowing to transfer genetic sequences from one organism to another.
Moreover, for some fundamental basic ideas applications can be nothing but
indirect (Guellec, 2007). This is the case of the research tools which bear no
direct improvements in the consumer￿ s utility, but they serve to develop fu-
ture marketable innovative products (Cozzi and Galli, 2008). The debate on
the patentability of the research tools specially warmed up with reference of
the ability of basic research to spawn marketable developments. Merger and
Nelson (1990) emphasized the importance of considering the economic signi￿-
cance of patents from the perspective of their scope. These authors (see also
Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) argued that, particularly in the most innovative
industries, fundamental patents are often overbroad and this is likely to slow
down follow-on research and warned against an excessive commercialization of
scienti￿c advances reached by public R&D: "A science-based industry straddles
the public world of science and private world of intellectual property; an over-
broad patent makes private part of the public science such an industry strives to
2Scotchmer (2004) and Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006) provide two recent optimal
surveys on the literature.
3Scotchmer, (1991).
4commercialize"4.
Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein￿ s (2008) model analysis multi-stage discovery
processes in R&D activity where the allocation of intellectual property rights is
crucial for the promotion of knowledge production and innovation. In particular,
in the comparison between free and private research, they ￿nd that in early
stages of the innovation process it is optimal to opt for a public innovation
system, able to better guarantee the researcher￿ s freedom respect to private-
sector research which, by contrast, becomes optimal in the later stages of the
discovery process.
The possibility of a "neck-to-neck" competition between current technolog-
ical leaders and their followers in an industry was ￿rst introduced by Aghion,
Harris and Vickers￿ s (1997) model and later developed by Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers (2001). In these models innovations by leaders and followers occur
step-by-step. Unlike the majority of R&D-driven growth models where all inno-
vations are made by outsider ￿rms5, Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) provide
a powerful analytical structure able to make innovation incentives depend not
so much upon post-innovation expected monopoly rents, but upon the expected
di⁄erence between the post-innovation and the pre-innovation monopoly rents
of the incumbents6.
O￿ Donoghue (1997), O￿ Donoghue and Zweimuller￿ s (2004), and Hunt (2004
and 2006) are particularly interesting in that they identify a role for patents in
providing protection against future innovators: patentability requirement and
leading breadth are able to a⁄ect the characteristics of new products, or the
types of cost reduction that ￿rms pursue, and could compensate the tendencies
of suboptimally small innovations.
Unlike Aghion and Howitt (1996), Cozzi and Galli￿ s (2008) analysis assumes
that in each sector of the economy the innovation process can be split into
two stages: basic research and applied research. The authors build a model to
analyze the behavior of the public sector under di⁄erent intellectual property
regimes; calibrate the model to the US data; and punctually estimate the basic
and applied research productivity from 1975 to 1981. The two model-structures
just depicted - Aghion and Howitt (1996) and Cozzi and Galli (2008) - appear
to be quite complementary since they are best suited to address the di⁄erent
concerns present in the literature about the desirability of reforming the patent
system. In particular, Aghion and Howitt￿ s (1996) model seems more appropri-
ate for exploring the e⁄ect of enhancing patent protection in a contest in which
- according some authors like Merger and Nelson (1990) - the most innovative
industries are those of most recent creation, like the biotechnological. Cozzi and
Galli￿ s (2008) approach applies fairly well to the conception, pioneered by Nelson
and Rosenberg, of a basic academic investigation and applied R&D as mutually
4Merges and Nelson, (1990).
5Cozzi (2007) proved that, when R&D is perfectly competitive, this is not a necessary
implication of the Arrow e⁄ect.
6For a theoretical integration of the "neck-to-neck" competition approach with the analysis
of the welfare-maximizing IPR policy see Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008).
5feeding activities7, emphasizing that "the traditional distinction between "basic"
and "applied" science are anachronisms8".
Finally, important contributions try to analyze the allocation of property
rights in the contest of heterogeneous R&D activity, by merging the literature
on R&D organization, optimal allocation of intellectual property rights and the
incomplete contract theory, developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990). Two in￿ uential examples of this literature on the allocation
of property right are Aghion and Tirole (2004a and 2004b)￿ s articles. In these
models two separate entities - a research unit and a customer- are involved
into two simultaneous but operatively distinct stages of the innovation process:
research and development (or commercialization). The division on the property
rights across the two entities determines the incentive to supply their respective
e⁄orts.
However, it was after the pioneering microeconomic contributions of Fuden-
berg et al. (1983), Reinganum (1985), Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Green
and Scotchmer (1995) that economists had become aware of the strategic di-
mension of sequential research activity. The possibility that in the real world
innovators may use the patents they hold just to block future innovators (Bessen
and Maskin, 2009), and/or prevent them from commercializing their products
raised a still increasing concern9 not only among academics.
3 The Model
This section sets up a Schumpeterian model with sequential innovation where
basic research ￿ndings are conceived and put into the public domain, and sub-
sequently embodied into marketable products by a large number of perfectly
competitive private R&D ￿rms. This builds on a simpli￿ed version of Cozzi and
Galli￿ s (2008) section on unpatentable research tools. Unlike that paper, we are
able to introduce a richer view of the public research sector, as well as obtain
analytical results.
7"Medical scientists still lack understanding of just why and how certain e⁄ective phar-
maceuticals do their work, and theories about that change from time to time. Much of
engineering design practice involves solutions to problems that professional engineers have
learned ￿work￿, without any particularly deep understanding of why........Thus, the discovery
by Shockley and his team at Bell Laboratories that a semiconductor device they had built
as an ampli￿er worked, but not in the way they had predicted, led him to understand that
there was something wrong, or incomplete, about the theory in physics regarding the electrical
characteristics of semiconductors, which in turn led to his own theoretical work, and a Nobel
Prize. A non-trivial amount of research in the biomedical sciences is aimed at understanding
better why the human body responds, or doesn￿ t respond, to particular substances (including
pharmaceuticals) the way it does. ... a number of most challenging puzzles science has had to
face have been made visible by or been created by new technologies, and the puzzles of why
they worked as they did." (Nelson, 2006: p. 7-8).
8Rosemberg and Nelson (1996, p.91).
9Heller and Eisenberg (1998) suggested the existence of a tragedy of the anticommons, i.e.
a proliferation of upstream intellectual property rights which greatly amplify the transaction
cost of downstream R&D, thus hampering downstream research for biomedical advance.
6Time is continuous with an unbounded horizon and there is a continuum
of in￿nitely-lived dynasties with identical intertemporally additive preferences.
Heterogeneous labour, skilled and unskilled, is the only factor of production.
Both labour markets are assumed perfectly competitive. In the ￿nal good sectors
! 2 [0;1] monopolistically competitive ￿rms produce di⁄erentiated consumption
goods by employing unskilled labour, whereas research ￿rms employ skilled
labour.
3.1 Households
A each time t ￿ 0 population is constant and normalized to 1. The represen-






where ￿ > 0 is the subjective discount rate, and u(t) is the instantaneous utility












where djt (!) is the per family member consumption of a good ! 2 [0;1] of
quality j (that is, a product that underwent j = 0;1;2;::: quality jumps) at
time t. This formulation, the same as Grossman and Helpman (1991), assumes
that each consumer prefers higher quality products. In particular, parameter
￿ > 1 measures the size of the quality upgrades (i.e., the magnitude of product
innovations).
The representative consumer is endowed with L > 0 units of skilled labor
and M > 0 units of unskilled labor summing to 1. Since labour bears no
disutility it will be inelastically supplied for any level of non negative wages.
Since population is normalized to 1, L and M will also equal, in equilibrium,
the per-capita supply of skilled, respectively, unskilled labour. Unskilled labor
can only be employed in the ￿nal goods production. Skilled labour can only
perform R&D activities.
In the ￿rst step of the consumer￿ s dynamic maximization problem, she selects
the set Jt(!) of the existing quality levels with the lowest quality-adjusted prices.
Then, at each instant, the households allocate their income to maximize the








Here E(t) denotes per-capita consumption expenditure and pjt(!) is the
price of a product of quality j produced in industry ! at time t. Let us de￿ne
7j￿
t (!) ￿ maxfj : j 2 Jt(!)g Using the instantaneous optimization results, we





















The solution to this maximization problem yields the static demand function:
djt(!) =
￿
E(t)=pjt(!) for j = j￿
t (!)
0 otherwise. (6)
Only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price is consumed, since there
is no demand for any other good. We also assume, as usual, that if two products
have the same quality-adjusted price, consumers will buy the higher quality
product - although they are formally indi⁄erent between the two products -
because the quality leader can always slightly lower the price of its product and
drive the rivals out of the market.
Therefore, given the independent and - in equilibrium and by the law of large
number - deterministic evolution of the quality jumps and prices, the consumer
will only choose the piecewise continuous expenditure trajectory, E(￿), that





Assume that all consumers possess equal shares of all ￿rms at time t = 0.
Letting A(0) denote the present value of human capital plus the present value
of asset holdings of the family at t = 0, each household￿ s intertemporal budget
constraint is: Z 1
0
e￿R(t)E(t)dt 5 A(0) (8)
where R(t) =
R t
0 r(s)ds represents the equilibrium cumulative real interest rate
up to time t.
Finally, the representative consumer chooses the time pattern of consump-
tion expenditure to maximize (7) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
(8). The optimal expenditure trajectory satis￿es the Euler equation:
_ E(t)=E(t) = r(t) ￿ ￿ (9)
where r(t) = _ R(t) is the instantaneous market interest rate at time t.
Euler equation (9) implies that a constant (steady state) per-capita con-
sumption expenditure is optimal when the instantaneous market interest rate
equals the consumer￿ s subjective discount rate. Since preferences are homo-
thetic, in each industry aggregate demand is proportional to the representative
consumer￿ s one. E denotes the aggregate consumption spending and d denotes
the aggregate demand.
83.2 Manufacturing
In this section we examine the production side of the economy. We assume con-
stant returns to scale technologies in the (di⁄erentiated) manufacturing sectors
represented by the following production functions:
y (!) = M (!), for all ! 2 [0;1], (10)
where ￿ 2 (0;1), y (!) is the output ￿ ow per unit time, and M (!) is the
skilled labour employment in industry ! 2 [0;1]. Full employment and symme-
try imply that in equilibrium: M (!) = M.
In each industry, at each instant, ￿rms compete a la Bertrand. Given de-
mand function (6), within each industry product innovation is non-drastic, hence
the quality leader will ￿x its (limit) price by charging a mark-up ￿ over the unit
cost (remember that parameter ￿ measures the size of product quality jumps).
pj￿




Hence each monopolist earns a ￿ ow of pro￿t, in per-capita terms, equal to




Since M is constant, also E(t) = ￿M will be constant. Therefore, by the
Euler equation (9) the real interest rate will be constant:
r(t) = ￿. (13)
3.3 R&D Sectors
Traditionally, the European institutional organization of science-based research
has been similar to a pre-1980 US innovative environment. In order to em-
phasize the role of publicly hired researchers￿attitude towards more directly
marketable discoveries here we assume a normative framework in which the
patent protection of the basic R&D results cannot be awarded.
We assume that R&D is a two-stage process in continuous time: ￿rst a
"half idea" - or "research tool" - is invented by basic researchers, and then
a ￿nal product is invented by applied researchers building on the latest half
idea. Hence, after a "half idea" has arrived in an industry that lacked it, no
more research tools are needed in that industry until the next turn of product
improvement. Any new basic research result would be "redundant": maybe
useful for the researcher￿ s CV or reputation as a smart scientist, but not for
the pro￿t seeking downstream ￿rms. As a result, at any time t, the whole
set of industries [0;1] gets partitioned into two sets of industries: industries
! 2 A0 (temporarily) with no half-ideas and, therefore, with one manufacturing
quality leader (the ￿nal product patent holder) indirectly challenged by the
public R&D units; and the industries ! 2 A1 = [0;1]n A0, with one half-idea
9and, therefore, one manufacturing leader (the ￿nal product patent holder) and
a mass of private R&D ￿rms aiming to complete the half-idea and to displace
the current monopolist. These sets10 keep changing over time as a result of the
ongoing two-stage R&D processes. We assume that along each equilibrium the
sets A1 and A0 are measurable at all dates. Researchers can engage in useful
basic R&D only in ! 2 A0 industries and they can engage in applied R&D
activity aimed at a direct product innovation only in A1 industries. When a
quality improvement occurs in an A1 industry the R&D ￿rm that completed a
half-idea becomes the new quality leader and the industry no longer belongs to
A1, but to A0. When a half-idea discovery arises in an industry ! 2 A0 this
industry is no longer an element of A0, but becomes an element of A1 and the
second-stage downstream patent race starts. Notice that the two sets A0 and
A1 change over time, even if the economy is at a steady state. Figure 1, taken
from Cozzi and Galli (2008), illustrates this industrial dynamics.
At any instant we can measure the mass of industries without any half-idea
as m(A0) 2 [0;1], and the mass of industries with an uncompleted half-idea as
m(A1) = 1￿m(A0). Clearly, in a steady state these measures will be constant,
as the ￿ ows in and out will o⁄set each other, whereas o⁄ steady state they
might be changing. We assume that in all equilibria m(A0) and m(A1) are
di⁄erentiable functions of time. All innovation processes follow independent
Poisson processes, whose intensities are soon to be described.
Let nB(!;t) denote the mass of skilled labour employed in public universities
and undertaking basic R&D in industry ! 2 [0;1]; and let nA(!;t) denote the
10Better written as A0(t) and A1(t): we drop time indexes only to keep notation simpler.
10mass of skilled labour employed by freely entrant R&D ￿rms11 and undertaking
applied R&D in industry ! 2 A1. Each unit of basic research labour faces
probability ￿0n
￿a
B (!;t) per unit time of discovering a new result in industry
! 2 [0;1], where ￿0 > 0. This implies that also redundant basic research results
can be invented. Each unit of applied research labour can invent a new product
in an industry12 ! 2 A1 with probability intensity ￿1n
￿a
A (!;t), where ￿1 > 0.
Parameter a > 0 is an inter-industry congestion parameter, capturing the risk
of R&D duplications, knowledge theft and other diseconomies of fragmentation
in the R&D.
The government exogenously sets a constant fraction, ￿ LG 2 [0;L], of popula-
tion of skilled workers to be allocated to the basic research activities conducted
by universities and other scienti￿c institutions. Moreover, basic R&D expen-
diture, equal to ￿ LGws(t), is funded by lump sum taxes on consumers. The
assumption of lump sum taxation guarantees that government R&D expendi-
ture does not imply additional distortions on private decisions. This allows us
to use the previous notation and derivations also for the case of a balanced gov-
ernment budget taxing all households in order to transfer the tax proceeds to
the basic R&D workers.
3.3.1 Public Research Incentives
We could have made the following behavioral rule for public researchers: be-
ing public researchers perfectly mobile across sectors, when in a sector ! that
lacked a half-idea, i.e. belonged to A0, a half-idea appears, i.e. it becomes an
element of A1, the public R&D workers stop carrying out basic research in that
sector and ￿nd the closest basic research problem only in the new A0 set of
sectors. This would be optimal from a social point of view. This may represent
the case of university researchers who keep investigating open trajectories only
when they know that private R&D ￿rms will later pro￿t from adapting to their
market the new knowledge they may create. Unguided by the invisible hand,
researchers may follow it indirectly, motivated by perfect altruism towards so-
ciety: depending on their social motivation they will choose to become more or
less intellectually mobile.
Notice that in our stylized economy ￿nal product patents are the main source
of pro￿ts. Therefore, the "altruistic" scientist knows he/she is helping, for free,
private ￿rms to make potentially huge pro￿ts. Hence, pure envy could frustrate
altruism, particularly so if public academics share an anti-pro￿t view of science.
11Obviously, they could be private or public. In so far as even universities have "privatized"
divisions, they could pursue pro￿t as well. None of these considerations about the ￿rm own-
ership change the results, though of course they could change the real world interpretation
and the discussion about the realism of this model in the face of actual data.
12If we admit also the possibility of inventing redundant "me too" ￿nal products, in ! 2 A0,
we will assume that the patent o¢ ce will never grant a patent on it, thereby killing the
incentive to develop it. This is why there is no loss of generality in excluding them from the
start. Instead, o⁄ering a probability of the patent o¢ ce￿ s protecting them would generate an
interesting extension, joining our model with Segerstrom￿ s (1991) pioneering contribution on
Schumpeterian imitation.
11The ￿nal good monopolists - the ￿nal patent owners - will also be periodically
criticized for producing less than what perfectly competitive ￿rms would in a
patent free world: this could discourage "altruistic" scientists and make them
retreat in an ivory tower, just to avoid participating in a game they do not like13.
Therefore the di¢ culty in disentagling "altruism" towards consumer needs from
"altruism" towards rich capitalists pro￿ting from temporary monopolies is as
old as the patent system.
Hence, somewhat more realistically, we assume that individual "altruism"
is negligeable, and pecuniary and status seeking incentives take the lead. In
this paper, we imagine that the public sector tries to induce more attention
to consumer needs by prizing (respectively, penalizing) the basic researchers -
in excess of the usual skilled wage income, ws - based on how strongly they
outperform (respectively, underperform) their colleagues. Let the prize per unit
of excess discovery be ￿. If the researcher is inventing a redundant research
tool (i.e. a research tool in a sector ! 2 A1), the prize will not be granted
with probability p, while he/she will be prized anyway with probability 1 ￿ p.
Redundant discoveries detection probability p is less than 1 due to screening
problems. Letting yi(t) denote the expected income ￿ ow of public researcher i
targeting sector !, at time t, we can write:
yi(t) =
￿
ws(t) + ￿[(1 ￿ p)￿0nB1(!;t)￿a ￿ AD(t)] if ! 2 A1
ws(t) + ￿[￿0nB0(!;t)￿a ￿ AD(t)] if ! 2 A0
(14)
where AD(t) is the aggregate expected number of discoveries per-basic re-
search labour, to be computed later from basic research equilibrium allocations.
Notice that we are assuming that the researcher￿ s time is fully absorbed by the
sector ! he/she chooses. This indivisibility is just to facilitate the reader, but it
is not needed at all: in fact, the indi⁄erence condition to be derived soon guar-
antees any allocation, hence restoring full consistency with the representative
agent parable.
Scheme (14) can also be re-interpreted in terms of non-economic rewards:
according to this interpretation, ￿ measures the pecuniary equivalent of an
additional unit of "status", which is granted by the researcher￿ s community
in recognition of his/her awareness of social needs when undertaking basic re-
search14; moreover, detection probability p measures how closely the community
can monitor the individual researcher, thereby being a⁄ects by the prevailing
level of social capital in the economy. According to the recent interesting empir-
13We could cite plenty of press articles and books making arguments in this direction.
14In a similar way, among the motivations of Open Source programmers is "ego grati￿cation
from peer recognition" (Lerner and Tirole, 2005, p. 103). We all know the useful e⁄ects for
application of such a social norm, favored by a kind of electronic social capital. According
to the same authors, "As in open source, the direct ￿nancial returns from writing academic
articles are typically nonexistent, but career concerns and the desire for peer recognition
provide powerful inducements", (Lerner and Tirole, 2005, p. 116-117). See Maurer and
Scotchmer (2006) for an excellent interdisciplinary survey of the literature about this complex
phenomenon.
12ical analysis of Akcomak and Weel (2009), probability p should have a positive
e⁄ect on the long-run equilibrium innovation rate in the economy.
4 Equilibrium
Since "half-ideas", lacking direct industrial applicability, are not patentable,
no private research ￿rm will be looking for them. Let ￿ LG denote the total
mass of researchers employed in the public laboratories; hence it must be: R
[0;1] nB(!;t)d! = ￿ LG. Research tools discovered by public laboratories will
be available to everyone, which implies that private R&D ￿rms will ￿ ood into
the A1 sectors, racing to patent the new ￿nal product.
We will study symmetric equilibria, in which nA(!;t) ￿ nA(t), and
nB(!;t) =
￿
nB0(t) if ! 2 A0
nB1(t) if ! 2 A1
In equilibrium, the basic researchers will allocate themselves over the set of
industries, that is:
￿ LG = nB0(t)m(A0) + nB1(t)m(A1). (15)
In light of the de￿nitions so far, dropping time indexes, we can express the
skilled labor market equilibrium as:
L = ￿ LG + m(A1)nA: (L)
Eq. (L) states that, at each date, the aggregate supply of skilled labor, L,
￿nds employment in the public R&D laboratories, ￿ LG, and in the R&D ￿rms
of the A1 sectors, nA. Therefore the mass of skilled labour employment per A1
industry is:
nA =
L ￿ ￿ LG
1 ￿ m(A0)
. (16)









In light of eq. (16), it can be written as:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 ￿ m(A0))￿1
￿






In equilibrium, the researcher will be indi⁄erent as to where to target his






















a [1 ￿ m(A0)] + m(A0)
These in turn imply that the recorded (and approved) number of discoveries




B0 ￿0m(A0) + (1 ￿ p)n1￿a











Obviously, only part of this ￿ ow of basic research results turn out to be
useful to the industries. This ￿ ow of useful "half ideas" is given by:
￿0n1￿a
















Ceteris paribus, an increase in the public sector accuracy in prizing useful in-
ventions - represented by our parameter p - generates an increase in the number
of basic research results per unit time. Notice that, in our incentive scheme, it
is not the absolute amount of the prize ￿ that matters, but only the accuracy
in the screening process. Moreover, given the "rat race" aspect of our reward15,
no payment is required from the government on average. In fact, AD is equal
to the expected number of discoveries per unit time, which is the same for each
basic researcher regardless of his/her product line choice.
Eq. (19) gives the ￿ ow out of the A0 sector, which, in a steady state, coin-
cides with the ￿ ow out of the A1 sector, i.e. with the economy-wide innovation
rate. That innovation rate is maximal and equal to ￿0￿ L
1￿a
G when p = 1. This
emphasizes the importance of public institutions￿being careful in prizing only
the potentially useful basic research results, that is in successfully discouraging
the neglect of social needs by the basic researchers.
Plugging eq. (18) into (17) gives:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 ￿ m(A0))
a ￿1
￿










15Cozzi (2004) showed the potentially important growth and ￿scal policy e⁄ects of status
seeking motivations, in a model of physical and human capital accumulation.
14This is a ￿rst order di⁄erential equation in m(A0), which is globally stable.
In fact, the right hand side is continuous and strictly decreasing in m(A0);
moreover it is positive for m(A0) = 0, and it is negative for m(A0) = 1, as
immediately checked. Therefore m(A0) always tends to m(A0) = ~ m0 2]0;1[.
In a steady state, eq. (20) implies:
(1 ￿ ~ m0)
a ￿1
￿







a (1 ￿ ~ m0) + ~ m0
￿1￿a
. (21)
From the implicit function theorem, we obtain d ~ m0




(1 ￿ ~ m0)
a ￿1
￿
L ￿ ￿ LG
￿1￿ai
> 0.
Since (1 ￿ ~ m0)
a ￿1
￿
L ￿ ￿ LG
￿1￿a
is indeed the steady state innovation rate
in the economy, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 The higher the government accuracy in prizing basic research,
p, the higher the steady state equilibrium innovation rate of the economy. This
e⁄ect is increasing in L and decreasing in ￿ LG. The amount of the prize, ￿,
plays no role as long as it is positive.
As previously mentioned, we can reinterpret prize ￿ as the marginal social
status conferred to the basic researchers who invent more useful research tools,
as compared to those who just think of shortcuts at enriching their CVs. Con-
sistently, we can re-interpret detection probability p as the consequence of higher
levels of social capital, which guarantees more accuracy in the status awarded
to the most socially aware basic researchers. Hence we can state:
Proposition 2 The higher social capital the stronger the e⁄ect of status-seeking
altruism on the equilibrium innovation rate.
This is in line with Akcomak and Weel￿ s (2009) empirical ￿nding of a positive
e⁄ect of social capital, measured in by the level of trust, on innovation and
growth in 102 European regions.
Unlike Cozzi and Galli (2008), here we do not need to solve for the rest of
the variables (values of patents and ￿rms, skill premium, etc.), but the readers
could easily do it by themselves along the lines of that paper. The reason why
the derivation of the steady-state equilibrium innovation rate is much simpler
here is that the skilled labour is assumed employed only in the R&D sectors.
Cozzi and Galli (2008), instead, assumed that skilled labour was used both in
R&D and in manufacturing, which complicated the model a lot, but of course
allowed for the skill premium to play an important allocative role: such greater
realism justi￿ed the real world calibrations, which would be hardly credible in
the current model. However, the advantage of our simpler formulation is to
deliver rigorous analytical results in a transparent way.
155 Final Remarks
This paper has incorporated monetary and non-monetary incentives to public
basic research, within a general equilibrium R&D-driven growth model in which
the innovation process is decomposed into two successive innovative stages. We
have shown that public research institutions￿targetness as well as social aware-
ness supported by social capital may matter for innovation and growth.
The extension of multisector Schumpeterian models to a relatively realistic
dimension - multi-stage R&D - allows us to depict a stylized economy similar
to the current European system of innovation, and to set a potentially useful
framework for an assessment of potential US-oriented policy shift towards the
extension of patentability to research tools and basic scienti￿c ideas. These
normative innovations have been modifying the US industrial and academic
lives in the last two decades. In a useful assessment of the publicly run basic
research, we emphasize the crucial role of the public researcher￿ s social awareness
of the potential utility of their intellectual discoveries. If they try to target their
research e⁄orts where society really need, they will positively a⁄ect long run
per-capita growth.
The recent decades have witnessed a signi￿cant increase in the number of
patents issued every year by the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (PTO): in
1980 the PTO issued approximately 66,000 patents; in 2000 such number had
grown to 175,00016. Many scholars addressed as a reason for the increase in the
overall patenting activity in U.S. the changing legal environment that opened
the way to the so called "pro-patent era", de facto strengthening the rights of
the patent holders (see Gallini, 2002; Cozzi and Galli, 2008). Other authors
(for example, Kortum and Lerner, 1998) commented that this increase may
have somehow re￿ ected an increased innovation activity spurred by changes in
the management of research. Our model, by highlighting a possible channel,
suggests that, in the US after 1980, institutional and cultural changes have
connected basic and applied research more than before, i.e. the academic and
the industrial worlds looked at each other more friendly. This in turn encouraged
more public researchers to exit the ivory tower, with the economy bene￿ting
from this shift.
Economic history from the end of the feudal era to nowadays showed us
how law and society are always mutually linked in a dialectic way, such that
the one is able to determine the other￿ s morphology and together ￿ ow into the
cultural change. We could think about the Bayh-Dole act17 and the series of
patent system reforms incurred in the U.S. at the beginning of the Eighties as
endogenous or culturally determined; consistently with the assertion of David
Mowery : "Bayh-Dole is an e⁄ect of growth in US university patenting during
16US Patent Statistics from the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce, available at
http://uspto.gov/web/o¢ ces/ac/ido/oeip/taf/apat.pdf.
17In the U.S. the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 simpli￿ed the patenting of
government-supported research outputs, which are often upstream to the development of
innovative marketable products.
16the 70s, as well as one of the several causes of increased academic patenting
during the 80s".
Whenever direction the causality goes, what is certain is that during the
thirty years following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act US universities expe-
rienced a serious attempt to re-optimize, or to better balance the objective of
developing new revenue sources while simultaneously maintaining the norms
related to the conduct of academic research18.
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